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PROBLEMS WITH USING COLLABORATION
TO SHAPE ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY
Michael McCloskey*
Popular ideas may not always be as good as they seem. Currently,
popular ideology suggests that public agencies should shape public
policy by relying on collaboration among stakeholders. Collaboration
allows parties to avoid conflict and settle issues amicably. This approach
to resolving disputes relates to the general principles in the field of
Alternative Dispute Resolution.
While collaboration has its appropriate uses, over-reliance on it can
displace traditional sources of legitimacy. For example, agencies that
have derived their legitimacy from the electoral processes of
representative democracy would be forced to secure a direct sanction
from parties affected by the use of the collaborative process.
The collaborative process requires stakeholders of a community to
actively seek agreement on the resolution of their dispute. Some
proponents of the collaborative process believe that it entails finding
stakeholders who have the power to make commitments to support an
agreed upon solution, as well as persuading any of their followers,1 to do
likewise. Generally, the government is expected to embrace the agreed
upon policies.
This idea is being advanced particularly in the context of decisions
that are made by land management agencies and land use planning
agencies. In particular, it is often being applied in the case of
watersheds. It may also be applied to decisions regarding the site
selection and operation of industrial facilities. In addition, there are
cases where it is being applied to policy decisions of national scope.
This lecture explores why moving away from the practice of
representative democracy is a bad idea. Particularly troubling is the
Chairman, Sierra Club.
See, e.g., Steven W. Selin et al., Has Collaborative Planning Taken Root in the National
Forests, J. FORESTRY, May 1997, at 27. A planner is quoted as saying that "when an
agreement is reached, there can be no end runs." Id. See also Basic Guidelines: Wyoming
CRM, in CHRONICLE OF COMMUNITY, Winter 1997, at 21 ("All agency and organizational
representatives must have the AUTHORITY to speak and make decisions for their
respective entities.").
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casual, uncritical way in which steps are being taken in this direction
through growing reliance on collaboration as the "new way of doing
business."
I. BACKGROUND
Collaboration is being urged upon government in a variety of
reports. In 1996, the President's Council on Sustainable Development
declared that "collaborative decision making must be encouraged and.
must involve all levels of government .... ,,2 The latest report from the
Council notes that "community participation and multi-stakeholder
collaboration processes at... all levels of government... can also help
optimize the efficacy and efficiency of environmental management
decisions." 3  In an interim report in 1997, the Council stated that
"collaboration is a process that is helping us learn how to solve society's
complex problems."4 The Council went on to assert that collaboration
"may result in equal or better environmental and social outcomes at
lower costs than traditional, more adversarial approaches." 5
In its latest report, the Aspen Institute also commends "collaborative
planning processes [that] allow a 'community' (defined broadly to
include a city, township, watershed or other geographic or non-
geographic unit with common interests) to avoid natural resource
problems by addressing potential conflicts before they arise."6 The
Enterprise for the Environment Report ("E4E") issued last year also calls
for "place-based environmental strategies that offer local organizations
and citizens 'a constructive way to build consensus on environmental
protection issues.'" 7 In reviewing that report, one analyst stated that
2 See THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: A NEW
CONSENSUS 29 (1996).
3 See THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE
AMERICA 52 (1999).
4 See THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, BUILDING ON CONSENSUS:
A PROGRESS REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 19 (1997) [hereinafter BUILDING ON
CONSENSUS].
5 Id.
6 See THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, THE STEWARDSHIP PATH: To SUSTAINABLE NATURAL SYSTEMS
17 (1999).
7 See Cary Coglianese, The Limits of Consensus: The Environmental Protection System in
Transition: Toward a More Desirable future, ENV'T, April 1999, at 28, 31 (1999) [hereinafter
Coglianese, Limits of Consensus].
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"E4E joins a growing chorus of support for collaborative approaches to
environmental policymaking." 8
In a paper prepared for the World Conservation Union ("IUCN") on
collaborative management of protected areas such as parks, the author
urges "effective sharing of management responsibilities among all the
parties involved in the agreement thus lessening the burden of the
agency in charge." 9 However, the author does recognize the "potential
opposition by agencies or individuals unwilling to share authority with
other stakeholders." 10 In evaluating the stakeholder processes used in
the pilot phase of Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") XL
project, a consultant recommended that the agency "use consensus-
decision-making processes when serious objections to the final outcome
might succeed in blocking implementation...."" This approach is
contrasted with occasions when "public-consultation and information-
sharing processes" might be used instead.12
In a monograph reporting on use of these approaches in the Pacific
Northwest, a practitioner observes that consensus decision-making,
"unlike government-driven processes, ... empowers the community [to
decide] where it wants to be in the future." 3 Some proponents of the
collaborative process call for "transference of power directly to
citizens."14
In some reports that commend collaboration, it is not always clear
whether this process is being urged simply to make input to government
or whether something more is intended. But the passages just quoted
suffer from no such imprecision. These passages clearly indicate that.
government is being targeted at all levels, that decision-making that
affects outcomes is the object, and that power-sharing is sought.
a Id.
9 Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend, Collaborative Management of Protected Areas: Tailoring the
Approach to the Context 26 (IUCN, Gland, Switzerland 1996) (on file with author).
10 Id. at 27.
11 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENcY, EVALUATION OF PROJECT XL STAKEHOLDER
PRocESSES: FINAL REPORT 2 (1998).
12 Id.
13 See Jeff Goebel, Founders of a New Northwest, in SUSTAINABLE NORTHWEST 36 (1997).
14 See JOINT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 5 (Oct. 1,1996).
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I. AN INQUIRY
The implications of these ideas are profound. They suggest that
government is simply another stakeholder, not the body that represents
all stakeholders. Additionally, they suggest an absence of distinctive
expertise in both agencies and government and that more expertise
resides in casually assembled groups of stakeholders. Furthermore, they
suggest that, while the government may still have power to enforce a
decision, it lacks any special legitimacy to make decisions. Apparently,
government is no longer viewed as having any right to exercise authority
by virtue of the democratic process that chooses the office holders who
direct government.
One can only wonder from where such revolutionary ideas came.
They may reflect the ascendancy of the "boomer" generation and its life-
long antipathy to authority, especially government. Low voter turnout
may also undermine the legitimacy of governmental institutions. To
some extent, the diminished reputation of government may reflect a
sentiment that agencies have over-reached their competencies.
Moreover, a better-educated public may also bring more expertise to the
table than was once the case.
It must be acknowledged, however, that these ideas are attractive to
politicians. The ideas absolve the politicians from having to solve
intractable problems by simply retorting that "it is up to the citizens
themselves to solve the problems." They really provide "an easy way
out." In turn, this mindset actually allows politicians and government to
abdicate whenever they choose.
One must also note for the record that there are those in the
American business community who advocate using the collaborative
method. In fact, some public relations firms have identified
collaboration as a key strategy to enable the business community to
realize its goals. Collaboration is being sold as a device to avoid
disputes, "to get on with your plans." 5 Public relations firms emphasize
to clients that it "is not about relinquishing business decisions to external
stakeholders, nor is it about losing control." 16
Is See generally Kenneth D. Kearns & Anna L. West, Innovations in Public Affairs
Programming: Collaborative Planning and Beyond, in PRACTICAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN AN ERA OF
CHANGE (Lloyd B. Dennis et al. eds., 1996).
16 Id.
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At a 1995 conference on this subject in Blairsden, California, the
viewpoint of the timber industry was described as follows: "They
supported the local partnership activities [i.e., collaboration] on
philosophical grounds that forest management decision-making should
be driven more from the local level. And, they perceived local
partnership group processes as a means of breaking the existing policy
gridlock and achieving some management activity on the ground." 17
The industry's enthusiasm for the process was also evident at the
American Forest Congress, which took place in 1996.18
Reasoning along this line became embodied in the output of a
collaborative process that took place in Quincy, California, in the mid-
1990s.19 That collaboration pertained mainly to the management of a
nearby national forest, the Plumas National Forest north of Lake Tahoe.
The group meeting in the local library (known accordingly as the
"Quincy Library Group") recommended both increases in logging and
reserves for conservation. When the local Forest Service failed to
embrace their ideas, the ideas were taken to the local member of
Congress who succeeded in adding them as a rider to an appropriations
bill, whereby they became law. This case demonstrates most clearly that
these consensus processes are designed to be implemented; they are not
mere input. Furthermore, they are intended to shape policy.
III. CLAIMED ADVANTAGES
Proponents of the collaborative approach claim that the collaborative
approach consists of four basic types of advantages: better outcomes,
improved processes, greater acceptance, and desirable aftermaths.20
A. Better Outcomes
Through collaboration, the participants are thought to move beyond
posturing, stereotypes and narrow, traditional views of issues. Thus,
they gain a better understanding of the nature of problems. As they seek
common ground, it is believed they have a better chance of finding
17 See Jonathan Kusel et al., Report on the Lead Partnership Group Roundtable on
Communities of Place, Partnerships, and Forest Health 7 (Oct. 6-7, 1995, Blairsden, CA.) (on
file with the author).
18 See Report on the Seventh American Forest Congress Section on Communities (Feb. 20-
24,1996, Washington, D.C.) (on file with author).
19 For a discussion of this case, see Michael McCloskey, Local Communities and the
Management of Public Forests, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 624, 625-26 (1999).
20 See, e.g., BUILDmG ON CONSENSUS, supra note 4, at 19.
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solutions that are fresh, new and creative. Some think more
comprehensive solutions may also be found. Better outcomes might
stem from the fact that the stakeholders are drawn into a process where
they all share responsibility for finding a solution with which others can
live. Thus, they are supposed to become more constructive.
B. Improved Processes
The iterative nature of collaboration, with "give and take" dialogue
and the need to respond to others' concerns, is supposed to be the
mechanism that greatly improves the process. Through it, many believe
decisions will be produced at a lesser expense in terms of time and
money. They also think that the process will cover more ground and
probe into the issues at greater depth. Agency decision-makers,
however, are thought to be hobbled by their own biases and, thereby, are
limited in doing this.
C. Greater Acceptance
Many believe that the stakeholders involved in a collaboration will
have a greater sense of satisfaction with the outcome. Essentially, the
stakeholders will have invented it and will have come to learn first hand
why other alternatives could not be pursued. They will have seen which
options were not viable. As a consequence, the outcome is apt to be one
that they and their constituents will be able to accept.
D. Desirable Aftermaths
Finally, the process may leave a number of valued results in its
aftermath. Discord in affected communities may be reduced as
stakeholders gain experience by working together. The hope is that
communities can come together around these consensual outcomes.
Observing this success would prompt agencies themselves to learn how
to become more responsive to the public. Consequently, confidence in
public institutions would grow.
E. Drawbacks
However, not all share these high hopes.21  In fact, critics of
collaboration find problems with these suppositions, both in theory and
practice. In looking at empirical research and the E4E process, a high
21 See Coglianese, Limits of Consensus, supra note 7, at 30-32.
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profile collaborative policy dialogue, Cary Coglianese concludes that
"consensus-building processes are not well suited to meeting at least
three of their major objectives." 22
He asserts that "consensus-building shifts the ultimate goal away
from reaching a quality decision and moves it toward reaching a merely
agreeable one."2 He believes that "[tihey can lead to policies that are
based on cumbersome compromises of principles, the lowest common
denominator, and on the most tractable but least important issues." 24 He
also finds that they "may actually inhibit genuine innovation."2 Thus,
he doubts whether they necessarily produce better decisions.
Moreover, he is not convinced that time and money are saved.
Collaborative processes are time intensive; typically, many of the parties
complain about the time that must be committed, causing some to refuse
to participate. The process itself can often be wearing and exacts a toll.
Coglianese finds that regulations developed through negotiated
rulemaking take as long, if not longer, to develop as do other rules.26
Parties involved in some of EPA's XL projects found that the transaction
costs were very high,27 particularly the XL project involving Intel at
Chandler, Arizona.
Coglianese also doubts that collaboration builds trust and acceptance
among the parties. He points to the example of what happened with
EPA's rule on reformulated gasoline, which was the product of a
stakeholder negotiation (i.e., a "reg neg"). 28  The negotiation was
subjected to extensive court challenges. Additionally, it encountered
political resistance as well. Consequently, the collaborative process did
not resolve the dispute. In fact, Coglianese finds that affected parties
overall file court challenges to EPA's negotiated rules more frequently
than they do to rules formulated using more conventional procedures. 29
The Quincy Library Group's recommendations proved to be intensely




26 Coglianese, Limits of Consensus, supra note 7, at 31. See also Coglianese, Assessing
Consensus: The Promise and Peqrance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1309-10
(1997) [hereinafter Coglianese, Assessing Consensus].
2 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CONSTRUCIVE ENGAGEMENT RESOURCE
GUIDE: DRAFT 3,26 (Nov. 16, 1998)
2 See Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 26, at 1290-94.
29 Id. at 1307-09.
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controversial. The E4E participants have continued to differ on issues; in
fact, a number of them refused to sign the final project report.
Clearly, collaborative processes have, on occasion, produced some of
the claimed benefits. But the sweeping nature of the claims made for the
technique and the impulse to always rely on it are puzzling. A few
decades ago, mediation was suggested for environmental disputes in
special circumstances. 3° These included the notion of "ripeness." At that
time, theorists felt a dispute was only ripe for mediation when the
dispute had been deadlocked for long periods and none of the parties
were sure of prevailing. Few disputes would meet such criteria and,
thus, they would not be considered ripe for mediation.
Today, issues have been propelled into policy dialogues that are not
ripe. For example, the "Car Talks" between auto-makers and
environmentalists on the question of climate change occurred when the
issue in dispute did not satisfy the ripeness requirements. This initiative
of the Clinton Administration in the mid-1990s broke up without any
consensus. The auto-makers were not ready to concede the problem was
real. Nonetheless, the Clinton Administration took the position that it
was up to these parties to agree on what should be done, with the
implication that little could be done otherwise.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS
The expectation that collaboration will operate under consensus
rules would not be a problem if these processes were purely advisory in
nature. Now that many seek to engraft them onto public policy,
however, major problems appear. Most fundamentally the consensus
rule serves to overthrow the basic suppositions of representative
democracy. Instead of the directions of public policy being set by those
garnering the greatest support among the electorate, those directions
would be set by collaborations in which those with little support can
thwart the will of the majority. This turns democracy on its head.
Ironically, the consensus rule allows minorities to veto progress along
certain lines.
While minorities under consensus rules cannot force their
preferences on the majority, the majority cannot force its preferences on
minorities. A standoff results. Thus, consensus rules embody a built-in
30 See, e.g., the work of Gerald Cormickat the University of Washington with reference to
environmental mediation.
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bias towards the status quo; neither side has the power to move forward.
Whether that bias is desirable or not will depend on how one views the
status quo. The consensus rules, however, certainly are a bias against
change.
Moreover, trying to achieve representation through service on a
negotiating group, rather than through the electorate and representative
institutions, also poses problems. Most theorists agree that all
stakeholders with a real interest in the outcome ought to be members of
the group.31 But institutions of representative democracy provide many
more nuanced opportunities for various interests to be heard and exert
influence, particularly through opportunities to form alliances in the
electoral and lobbying processes. It is simply not mechanically feasible
to bring that many voices to the table in a collaborative exercise. These
exercises need to be of a workable size. Thus, in practice, fewer voices
can be heard.
In addition, another problem presents itself where national interests
would be addressed by community collaboratives. This arises in cases
similar to that of the Quincy Library Group, which did address certain
issues of national interest (e.g., issues of wilderness and endangered
species). In such cases, who is to represent these national interests?
Spokespersons for the relevant national groups might be appointed, but
it would not be convenient or economically feasible for them to attend
frequent meetings in far-off places. Surrogates might also be chosen
from among local sympathizers, but how can they be legitimated as
representatives in fact? The national groups might not agree that they
will faithfully represent their interests. In many cases, only a limited
portion of the interested parties will reside in the locality involved.
The collaborative process derives its putative legitimacy from
purporting to represent all of the affected and interested stakeholders.
Without purporting to represent all claims, any legitimacy the
collaborative process might claim is lost. Some are seeking to resolve
this dilemma by engineering a conscious transfer of power. Instead of
conceptualizing communities of interest (meaning the totality of all of
those with interests in a given question), they seek to shift the emphasis
to communities of place. They want to shift the focus from national
31 See, e.g., Linda R. Singer, SETTLING DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS,
FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 137 (2d ed. 1994). See also TELLUS INSTITUTE, When Does
Consensus-Building Yield More Effective Environmental Policy?, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PERSPECTIVES, December 1997, at 1.
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policy making to one focused on rural regions and to citizens close to the
sites affected.32 With regard to federal land management, they want to
reverse the trend toward national control and revest control in local
hands.33 Sometimes the concept of "place-based management" is also
intended to legitimate this change of focus; some want to change the
name of this to Community-Based Environmental Protection.34 The net
effect is to dispense with communities of interest and to put the focus
instead on communities of place. In that event, stakeholders solely from
that locality might suffice.
In placing the focus on communities of place, a massive change is
made in the decision-making process. Instead of issues being decided by
majorities or pluralities in a nationwide constituency, decisions would be
made in the context of small, dispersed constituencies through consensus
processes where minorities can veto outcomes. The power of such
constituencies would not be limited to local issues. Issues of broader
import would be subject to the local communities' decisions.
This power shift would have a particularly acute affect on urban
citizens who use and appreciate resources on public lands. They would
be effectively disenfranchised. In the process, economic interests of
citizens near to these lands would be given weight in preference to the
non-economic interests of more distant, urban citizens.
This is a prescription for frustrating the national will of the majority.
It subverts basic tenets of democracy and nationhood. But it is being
advanced under the rubric of collaboration and place-based
management.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE
The alternative to collaboration in this manner certainly is not to
ignore the public. Many techniques have been developed to facilitate
public participation in the process of developing public policy. Agencies
32 See, e.g., Louise Fortmann & Sally K. Fairfax, Forest Resource Policy, in RURAL POLICY FOR
THE 1990S, 270-80 (J. Christensen & C. Flora eds., 1991) (arguing that forest policy should be
"highly decentralized and localized").
33 For a discussion of this theme, see George Hoberg, From Localism to Legalism: The
Transformation of Federal Forest Policy, in WESTERN PUBLIC LANDs AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS 47,63-65 (Charles David ed., 1997).
34 EPA's NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY,
EPA 100-R-96-003, PROMOTING INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
4 (June 1996).
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have gained experience not only with standard techniques, such as
notice and comment and hearings, but also with newer tools such as
workshops, workbooks, charettes, and other means of consultation (e.g.,
electronic mail and web sites).
Each of these tools has certain features of value, as well as
shortcomings. It is usually wise to employ a number of them. They may
offer advantages that collaboration alone cannot provide. For instance,
hearings may provide an opportunity for many more people to
participate. Written comments for the record may sample the largest
segment of opinion. Predominant reliance on collaboration as "the way"
to involve the public may discourage use of these varied techniques,
which would be unfortunate. All of these techniques serve the essential
purposes of learning of the public's particular concerns, finding out what
the public wants, obtaining useful ideas from them, and testing the
relative support for these ideas. When agencies listen well, their public
relations improve.
Discussion among a group of stakeholders can be especially valuable
because of its interactive and progressive nature. Ideas can be shaped in
the "give and take" of discussion. All of the benefits of the group
discussion process, however, can be realized without posing problems if
three specific changes are made. First, the output of these discussions
should simply be regarded as input, not as finished policy needing only
official ratification. Public input may also come in other ways (e.g.,
through "notice and comment" and hearings). Second, the set of those
brought to the table should be balanced to represent not only local
interests but interests found at the state and national level too. To
facilitate such a variety of stakeholders, the places where these groups
meet should be moved around. Third, the discussion group should not
be held to a consensus rule; it should be able to make recommendations
based on voting, with decisions by majority rule. In that way, the group
would not be held hostage by minorities, nor be limited to the lowest
common denominator.
Getting rid of the consensus rule will make the composition of the
group a critical concern. This, in turn, will put emphasis on how the
group gets chosen and balanced. Some states have developed statutes to
guide this process for various boards and commissions. They specify
that various fields of expertise shall be represented, as well as various
interests. Sometimes they also disperse the appointing power among
different branches of state and local government. Through such
dispersed sources of appointment, defenses can be built against exerting
433
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control for any particular political agenda. Such boards have often
performed creditably.
The same method might be applied to advisory committees that are
expected to propose solutions to vexing problems. With such
composition, the committees would not become a primary dumping
ground for political appointees who need to be rewarded. Nor would
such groups be easily captured by the agencies they advise (as too often
happens at the federal level with FACA committees). They would not
belong to any one agency, though there would need to be a convening
power.
VI. CONCLUSION
Collaboration does not deserve to become the "new way" of doing
business. It is a cumbersome process that is plagued by disadvantages
that outweighs its perceived advantages. Its use should draw critical
examination. It does not represent a "magic bullet" that solves all
problems and restores confidence in governance. Turning over the
power of government to collaboratives is misguided and a departure
from democratic ideals. Most of the advantages of problem-solving
through group discussion can be obtained without retreating from the
norms of a representative democracy, without denying the claims of
national majorities and disenfranchising urban populations. This
approach should simply be added to the tool kit for public participation,
without the counter-productive consensus rule.
The consensus rule is based on the supposition that civic conflict is
the greatest problem of all, which simply is not the case. In many cases,
other problems are more important. On them, we need to know both
where everybody stands and what views command majority support.
We do not need to know what represents the lowest common
denominator.
Furthermore, conflict is inherent in exercising First Amendment
rights and making democracy work. Full-throated debate develops and
focuses issues, generates interest in them, educates the public, and
creates the will to find solutions. Within limits, it should be seen as a
positive factor. We do not need a tool to suppress such conflict.
On the issue of collaboration, the time has come to take a more
balanced view. Collaboration is not "the answer."
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